Analysis of
Wright, John. Hodder GCSE History for Edexcel: Conflict in the Middle East, 1945-95. Hodder Education

General remark
“The present problem of Palestine, indeed, is unintelligible without a knowledge of the history that lies behind it. No other problem of our time is rooted so deeply in the past.”
Report of the Peel Commission, July 1937 (p. 2)

The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1945-1995 cannot be understood or cogently analysed without substantial knowledge of the previous stages in the history of the area and of the peoples involved. The authors themselves understood that, as (despite referring to 1945-1995 in the title), they do attempt to provide ‘context’ starting as early as AD 70. Unfortunately, this apparent afterthought means that more than 2000 years of history (prior to the First World War) are summarily ‘dispatched’ in less than 300 words. Students are thus denied knowledge which is, in fact, essential in order to understand the topic.

Objection 1
Problematic content
“Conflict in the Middle East 1945-1995”

Reasoning
The book focuses exclusively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was neither the only, nor – arguably – the main Middle East conflict.

Suggested correction
The Arab-Israeli conflict, 1945-1995

Objection 2
Problematic content
(page 6) “Key topic 1 examines the birth of Israel, including the conflicting demands of Jews and Palestinians within the British Mandate in the years before 1945;”

Reasoning
It is an anachronism to talk about “Jews and Palestinians […] before 1945”. During the British Mandate, all residents of the Mandate were ‘Palestinians’.

“From the first the junior posts were filled by Palestinians, Arab and Jew”
Report of the Peel Commission, July 1937 (p. 43)

Suggested correction

Key topic 1 examines the birth of Israel, including the conflicting demands of Jews and Arabs within the British Mandate in the years before 1945;

Objection 3

Problematic content

(page 6) TIMELINE 1945-63 – Multiple issues:

Reasoning and suggested corrections

- It is unclear why a 1945-63 timeline should start with the First Arab National Congress of 1913. Even if the ‘1945’ is a mistake, surely the First Zionist Congress (1897) not just preceded it chronologically – but exceeded it in size (208 delegates, as opposed to 25) and arguably also in relevance in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By 1913, the Zionist movement had held no less than 11 congresses.
- The item “1920 – British given mandate for Palestine” is hard to understand. A much clearer wording would be ‘1920 – League of Nations grants Britain the mandate for Palestine’.
- Omission: the 1921 partition of the British Mandate of Palestine, with the establishment of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan (later the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan):
  “In return for providing a rudimentary administration and obviating the need for British military occupation, Abdullah in March 1921 gained assurance from Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, that no Jews would be allowed to settle in Transjordan. That guarantee effectively created Transjordan as an Arab country apart from Palestine, where the British commitment to a ‘national home’ remained a delicate problem between Abdullah and the British.”
- “1947 Britain ends the mandate”. Although the British Government announced on 11 December 1947 its intention to terminate the Mandate, legally it ended through the Palestine Bill, which received Royal Assent on 29 April 1948; in practice, the Mandate ended on 15 May 1948.
- “UN Partition Plan for Palestine”. Surely in terms of the Timeline, the event is not the ‘Plan’, but the UN Partition Resolution (i.e. UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947).

Objection 4

Problematic content

(page 7) “This partition plan sought to declare the creation of the state of Israel, and brought about the first Arab–Israeli War as furious neighbouring Arab states invaded Israel.”

Reasoning

The UN Partition Resolution sought to preserve the peace, given Arab hostility and threats, and Britain’s declared intention to withdraw its troops. The Resolution included the creation of two
states: a Jewish State and Arab State. There is no evidence that the Resolution “brought about” the war; quite the opposite: it was the threat of war that created the need for the UN debate and Resolution.

“The General Assembly
[...]
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;
[...]
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States [...] shall come into existence in Palestine.”

Suggested correction
Aimed at preserving peace, the UN Partition Resolution sought to divide the Mandate into two independent states: a Jewish state and an Arab state. This solution was accepted by the Jewish leadership, but rejected by the leaders of the Palestinian Arabs, as well as by the Arab states.

Objection 5
Problematic content
(page 7) “The problem of Palestine dates back thousands of years and involves the rival claims of Jews and Arabs to the area.

Reasoning
The conflict between Jews and Arabs over ‘ownership’ of the area does not date back “thousands of years”. Most scholars place the first instances of conflict in this sense in late 19 century.

“In 1886, rioting erupted in Petach Tikvah after a Jewish farmer confiscated Arab-owned donkeys grazing on his land.”

In addition, the use of the Western moniker ‘Palestine’ (as in “The problem of Palestine”) introduces a bias, as the meaning of the term has changed: it is nowadays associated with the Palestinian Arabs and the pro-Palestinian narrative. The pro-Israel term is ‘Eretz-Israel’. This is similar to many other instances – such as the Falkland Islands, which are referred by Argentina as ‘Las Malvinas’. A historian attempting to be balanced and non-partisan should use both terms.
Suggested correction
At the core of the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine/Eretz Israel are rival claims to the area.

Objection 6
Problematic content
(page 7) “The Jews were driven out of Palestine by the Romans after two revolts in AD70 and AD135.”

Reasoning
The use of the term ‘Palestine’ in this context is an anachronism. Jews did not live in “Palestine”, but (following the conquest of their independent kingdoms), in the Roman Province of Judaea. The Romans merged Judaea with the Province of Syria and named the new province Syria Palaestina. Most scholars place this change after the defeat of the Jewish Revolt in 135 CE and attribute the motivation to the Roman desire to ‘wipe the memory’ of the rebellious Jews. Moreover, the origins of the term ‘Palestine’ are nowhere explained. This is a potential source of confusion: the textbook introduces terms like Jews, Arabs, Palestine and Palestinians, but without explaining the relationship between those terms from an historical perspective.

“In an effort to wipe out all memory of the bond between the Jews and the land, Hadrian changed the name of the province from Iudaea to Syria-Palestina, a name that became common in non-Jewish literature.”

Coins minted by Jews during the 132-136 CE revolt against the Romans. The inscription reads “To the freedom of Jerusalem”.

Coins minted by the Romans, in which Jerusalem is already called “The Colony of Aelia Capitolina”.

Images of coins mentioned in the text.
What’s in a name?

It is common for countries and areas to have various names, given by various conquerors, by foreign travellers, or by the people who inhabited those places. For instance, the name ‘Egypt’ was applied to the area by the ancient Greeks and was adopted by the Romans. The modern Egyptians call their country Misr or Masr, not ‘Egypt’ or anything similar. Even today, most of the world uses the term Finland – the land of the Finns. But the Finns call themselves ‘suomalaiset’ and their country ‘Suomi’.

The term ‘Jews’ comes from ‘Judeans’, but the Jews initially called themselves ‘the people of Israel’. Judea was one of the independent Jewish kingdoms which ultimately was incorporated by the Romans in their Empire as the Province of Judea. The Jews repeatedly revolted against the Romans; after the defeat of the Great Revolt of 135 CE, the Romans drove most of the Jews out of Judea and renamed it ‘Palestine’. The name Palestine comes from the Philistines, an ancient population that migrated from the area of modern Greece and established a number of fortified cities on the Mediterranean coast. Europeans (who often adopted ancient Greek and Roman names) often called the area Palestine, but the Jews called it ‘Eretz Israel’ (the Land of Israel) – hence the name of the modern state.

During the British Mandate, both Arabs and Jews were referred to as ‘Palestinians’. But after the establishment of the State of Israel, it has become common to refer to Arabs from Palestine as Palestinians, to differentiate them both from Jews and from other Arabs.

Objection 7
Problematic content

(page 7) “In the early Middle Ages, the Arabs controlled a huge empire covering the Middle East, north Africa and south-western Europe.”

Reasoning

The sentence above ‘beats around the bush’ and does little to actually explain the connection of Arabs and Palestine, which is the topic of this subchapter. How did the Arabs come to ‘control’ the huge empire? Why do they raise a claim to Palestine, but not (for instance) to south-western Europe?

“Before the spread of Islam and, with it, the Arabic language, Arab referred to any of the largely nomadic Semitic inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula.”
Encyclopaedia Britannica,  

“Much of the detail about the Battle of Yarmouk, as it was styled, is not known for a certainty, but [...] it is one of the most decisive battles in human history. With this victory, Islam became the dominant religion in all of the
modern Middle East. Palestine and Syria became Muslim nations."

"From the eighth century, the Caliphate was gradually transformed from an Arab to an Islamic Empire in which membership of the ruling group was determined by faith rather than by origin."

"I ran across no Palestinian villager (or urbanite) who claimed personal descent from the Canaanites. Villagers typically traced their family or their hamûla’s [clan’s] origins back to a more recent past in the Arabian peninsula. Many avowed descent from some nomadic tribe that had migrated from Arabia to Palestine either during or shortly after the Arab-Islamic conquests."

"The war of 1914 found Muslim feeling still predominant. Most Ottoman Arabs were still loyal to their sovereign, who found sympathy also in British-occupied Egypt. But the pressures of the war years and the activities of the Allies led to a rapid development of Arab nationalism."
Suggested correction

In the antiquity, Arab tribes inhabited the Arabian Peninsula and its immediate vicinity. In the 7th century CE, an Arab man called Muhammad ibn Abdullah becomes the founder of a new monotheistic religion – Islam – whose followers are called Muslims. They see Muhammad as a Prophet sent by God to reveal and convert humanity to the true religion. Under the leadership of Muhammad, the Arab tribes are converted to Islam and unified. Muhammad dies in 632 CE. His successors take the title of caliph – meaning ‘God’s deputy’. They embark on a campaign of conquest. As part of the early campaign, they conquered most of Palestine in 636 CE. Jerusalem surrendered in 637 CE and Caesarea in 640. Some of the Arabs settled in the newly conquered territories. The local populations were generally converted to Islam and gradually adopted the Arabic language and culture.

By the 13th/14th century, the Arab-Islamic Caliphate began to decay. Some territories (for instance Spain and Portugal) were reconquered by the original inhabitants, while the remaining ones (including Palestine) became part of the Ottoman Empire.

Under the influence of European nationalist movements, towards the end of the 19th century some Arab intellectuals began to demand autonomy for the Arab provinces. Most Arabs, however, remained loyal to the Ottomans as the rulers of the Islamic empire.

Objection 8

Problematic content

(page 7) “By 1914, the Jews and Arabs had formed two rival groups in Palestine, with each beginning to view Palestine as their homeland.”

Reasoning

This is a very confusing passage, which presents multiple issues:

1. In 1914, the area was still part of the Ottoman Empire. The Jews represented a small minority (circa 7.5% of the total population, see McCarthy, Justin (1990). The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-07110-9). The instances of conflict encountered at the time are better understood as expressions of intolerance by the Arab majority towards an immigrant minority with ‘strange’ beliefs and customs – and not as the clash of two rival nationalist movements.

2. To suggest that the Jews began to view Palestine as their homeland “by 1914” is to ignore the central role of Eretz Israel in Jewish religion, culture and tradition. It also overlooks numerous attempts – by individuals as well as by groups of Jews – to ‘return’ to the land they saw as their ancestral homeland.

“Sound a great Shofar [instrument made of a rams horn, used in Jewish liturgy], for our freedom, & raise a flag to gather our exiles, and assemble us together quickly from the four corners of the earth to our homeland. Blessed are You, that assembles the displaced of His people, Israel.”

From the Amidah prayer, codified around 2nd century CE and recited by Jews three times a day.
3. It is an anachronism to refer to a Palestinian nationalist movement in 1914. The (relatively rare) expressions of nationalism found among Arabs in Palestine tended to be pan-Arab, rather than specifically Palestinian. Such nationalists viewed as ‘homeland’ not Palestine, but a larger Arab state (such as ‘Greater Syria’).

"The truth is – and Khalidi admits as much later on – that only with the Revolt of 1936-1939 does one begin to find expressions of a generally-felt ‘nationalist’ consciousness and of a ‘national’ effort to turn back the wheel and to halt the Zionist enterprise before it takes over the country. Until then, during the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries, only a very small minority of Arabs had a hand in anti-Zionist utterances and activities: most of the peasants, Bedouin, and urban poor devoted their minds and energies to problems of livelihood and at best took an interest in the welfare of their families, clans, and villages, rather than in any wider collective entity"


"In 1921, he [Palestinian Arab nationalist leader Haj Amin Al-Husseini] attended the Pan-Syrian Congress in Damascus, where he supported Emir Faisal’s bid to be king of Greater Syria, which was to include Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine"


Suggested correction
There have always been Jews who, as individuals or small groups, attempted to return to Palestine/Eretz Israel, which they viewed as their ancestral homeland. This intensified in the second half of the 19th century, under the influence of Zionism – a national emancipation movement in many ways similar to others that appeared in Europe around the same time. Between 1880 and 1914, tens of thousands of Jews (originating mainly from Eastern Europe and Yemen) immigrated to Palestine/Eretz Israel. Thus, the Jewish minority in Palestine/Eretz Israel increased from circa 4% of the total population in 1850, to circa 7.5% in 1914. The new immigrants were different from the majority Arab population, not just in terms of religion, but also linguistically and culturally. This caused some local friction between the two populations, although there were also instances of cooperation. Many in the upper layers of the Palestinian Arab population opposed the Jewish immigration and sought to incite the less politically-aware masses against it.

Objection 9
Problematic content
(page 8) "Supported by France, Britain made promises of independence to the Arabs of the Middle East in return for their support against the Turks. The Arabs accepted Britain’s promises and raised
an army to fight against the Turks. By 1918, the Arab and British forces had defeated the Turks. It seemed that the Arabs would achieve independence."

Reasoning
This is an inaccurate and misleading passage. The main issue is that it presents “the Arabs” as a monolithic bloc. In reality, there were many currents of opinion among the Arabs of the Middle East. Insofar as it can be assessed in the absence of any representative leadership, the majority of the Arab population was loyal to the Ottoman Empire as the embodiment of the Islamic Caliphate and to the Sultan as Caliph. Britain had not “made promises of independence to the Arabs of the Middle East”, but to a particular Arab nobleman – Hussein bin Ali, Sharif (Lord) of Mecca and leader of the Hashemite clan. The Hashemites had a lot of influence in Hijaz (the western regions of modern Saudi Arabia), but little to none elsewhere in the Middle East.

The passage also appears to exaggerate the military importance of the Hashemites’ actions. In reality, many more Arabs fought as part of the Ottoman Army than battled against it. After the war, it suited both the British and the Hashemite political interest (and, in Britain, the cultural racism of the time) to embellish those actions and create the myth of a ‘Revolt in the Desert’ led by ‘noble savages’ tempered by the cool and superior heads of British officers like ‘Lawrence of Arabia’. Nowadays, however, most scholars agree that the Sharifian revolt was a much smaller and less important event. It initially amounted to no more than a relatively small guerrilla force, paid and supplied by the British. Even towards the end of 1918, when it was already clear that the Ottomans were heading towards defeat, the Sharifian detachments led by Hussein’s son Faisal numbered only circa 4,000 fighters. The British forces, which were made up of soldiers from the entire British Empire (including India, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) numbered more than 40,000.

“Hussein bin Ali (1852-1931) was an unlikely candidate to lead a nationalist Arab revolt against Ottoman rule. [...] His main concern was to secure his own position and that of his family [...] There is no evidence to suggest that he was attracted to the ideas of Arab nationalism before the war: on the contrary, by temperament and upbringing he was a conservative and inclined to view nationalist ideology as an unwelcome innovation, inconsistent with the principles of Islam. [...] [T.E. Lawrence wanted to] glorify the revolt and to advertise its military successes. He also surrounded it with a romantic aura by portraying it as the product of a natural affinity between the British and the Arabs, or at least the ‘real’ Arabs, the nomads of the Arabian Desert. [...] The Hashemites promised much more than they were able to deliver. After Hussein’s proclamation, only a disappointingly small number of Syrian and Iraqi nationalists flocked to the sharifian banner. Many Syrian notables dissociated themselves from what they saw as treason. The Iraqis had their own leaders; and Iraqi Shia were particularly apprehensive about the prospect of a Sunni sharif taking over the country. [...] The Lebanese Christians saw no advantage in exchanging the old Islamic Empire based in Istanbul for a new Islamic Empire, or caliphate based in the Hijaz. The Egyptians were more hostile than all the others to the idea of separation from the Ottoman Empire and to being ruled from the backward Hijaz. Even in Arabia itself, popular support for the rebellion was nowhere near as enthusiastic and widespread as the
British had been led to expect. The Arabian Bedouin and tribesmen who made up the rank and file of the sharifian army were more attracted to British gold than they were to nationalist ideology. [...] The usual grand narrative of the Arab Revolt, based on T.E. Lawrence’s classic accounts, greatly exaggerates not only its spontaneity, size and scope but also its military value.”


If the contribution of ‘the Arabs’ to British victory in the First World War is to be mentioned, then surely the authors should not ignore the contribution made by Jews:

- Between 1915 and 1917, the Palestinian Jews that made up the Nili pro-British espionage network supplied important military information – an activity that ultimately cost them their lives.

  “[It was] largely owing to the information provided by the Aaronsohn network that General Allenby was able to conduct his campaign in Palestine so successfully.”

  Colonel Walter Gibbon, in charge of Near East Intelligence desk in the British War Office during the First World War

- Two Jewish military units (including many Palestinian Jews) were recruited into the British Army: the Zion Mule Corps (1915-1916, 630 soldiers, most of whom fought in the Gallipoli campaign) and the Jewish Legion (1917-1918, circa 5,000 soldiers, fought in the Battle of Megiddo).

- Dr. Chaim Weizmann was the President of the British Zionist Federation – and also a brilliant biochemist. During the First World War, acetone became a scarce strategic resource, as it was used to produce cordite, which in turn was a key ingredient for military munitions. Weizmann developed and placed at the disposal of the British military industry a novel process to make acetone by bacterial fermentation – thus providing critical support to the British war effort.

- More than half a million Jews fought in the armies of Britain, France and Russia.

The last sentence of the passage is misleading because it appears to imply that “the Arabs” did not achieve independence after the First World War. In reality, at least some of the Arabs did: Egypt became independent in 1922; the kingdoms of Hijaz and Nejd (which were later to be unified as Saudi Arabia) became independent in 1921. Iraq evolved gradually towards its independence by 1936.

Suggested correction

The First World War pitched against each other two imperial blocs: on one side the British, French and Russian Empires (later joined by Italy and the United States); on the other, the German, Austro-Hungarian, joined from 1915 by the Ottoman Empire. The British government sought (and, to some degree, found) additional allies among both Arabs and Jews. It made to its Arabs and Jewish partners promises that, although rather vaguely worded, were eagerly welcomed by these allies. Among the Arabs, the Hashemite clan became the main British allies and agreed to stage a revolt against the Ottomans. British emissaries promised the leaders of this clan (originally from Hijaz – the western regions of today’s Saudi Arabia) that they will get to rule a vast Arab kingdom in the Middle East. To the Zionist Movement, the British government promised (through the ‘Balfour Declaration’
– a letter signed by the then Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour) that it would “view with favour the establishment in Palestine of national home for the Jewish people”.

Objection 10
Problematic content
(page 8) “Britain also wanted to win over Jewish support for the war effort...”

Reasoning
This may be read to imply that Jews did not otherwise support the war effort. In reality, as shown above, Jewish support for the (British) war effort was very substantial.

Objection 11
Problematic content
(page 8) “… and a leading British politician, Arthur Balfour, was sympathetic to the Zionist cause.”

Reasoning
Despite the moniker, the Balfour Declaration was not an individual declaration by Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour. It was an official letter issued by the British Government. The Declaration served British interests as perceived by the government at the time and it is not clear to which extent Balfour’s personal sympathies influenced that. It’s also not clear why the authors of the textbook have chosen to assign to the Declaration motivations based on suppositions, rather than the explanation that Balfour himself gave in a meeting of the War Cabinet:

“The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that [...] from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made. The vast majority of Jews in Russia and America, as, indeed, all over the world, now appeared to be favourable to Zionism. If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America.”

Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting No. 261, Minute No. 12, 31 October 1917

Objection 12
Problematic content
(page 8) “This resulted in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 (see Source A) – a letter from the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, who was the leader of the Jews living in Britain.”

Reasoning
Lionel Lord Rothschild was, of course, a prominent figure in the British Jewish community, for instance as a philanthropist. However, it is not clear on what basis the authors enthrone him as “the leader of the Jews living in Britain”. Firstly, there was no such title. Secondly assuming that “the leader” is shorthand for ‘the President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews’, or alternatively for ‘Chief Rabbi’, in 1917 Lord Rothschild held neither of those positions (he became President of the Board in 1925). The text of the letter makes it clear that it was addressed to Rothschild as...
representative of the Zionist Federation – it is not clear why the authors of the textbook felt the need to add to that simple explanation.

In addition, the expression “the Jews living in Britain” (rather than ‘the British Jews’) is strange, to say the least. One does not say, for instance ‘Asians living in Britain’, but ‘British Asians’. Unless, that is, the meaning is that these Jews were not British?

Objection 13
Problematic content
(page 8) “This was a Jewish nationalist movement which emerged in the late nineteenth century in central and eastern Europe. It supported the setting up of a Jewish state in the territory defined as the historic Land of Israel (also referred to as Palestine or the Holy Land). The main aim of Zionism, until 1948, was the creation of the state of Israel.”

Reasoning
Nowadays, the term ‘nationalist’ has negative connotations that have nothing to do with Zionism, as understood in “the late nineteenth century”. Given the historical context, it would be more correct to describe Zionism as a ‘national emancipation movement’ – influenced by and in some ways similar to other national emancipation movements that were operating in Europe at the time.

The authors write that Zionism “emerged in the late nineteenth century in central and eastern Europe”, but do not qualify this with the historical background.

“Though Zionism originated in eastern and central Europe in the latter part of the 19th century, it is in many ways a continuation of the ancient attachment of the Jews and of the Jewish religion to the historical region of Palestine, where one of the hills of ancient Jerusalem was called Zion.”

Encyclopaedia Britannica

The rest of the text is simply clunky. Zionism did not ‘support the setting up…’; it ‘aimed to re-establish…’ If we are told that “the main aim of Zionism, until 1948, was…”, then the reader expects to then learn what is the main aim post-1948 and today.

Objection 14
Problematic content
(page 8) “Britain was now following three conflicting policies:

- promising the Arabs’ independence once the Turks had been defeated
- supporting the idea of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East
- agreeing with France to partition the Turkish Empire.”

Reasoning
The term ‘the Arabs’ is once again used loosely – especially in this context. Britain made promises to the Hashemite clan – and had qualified those promises with exclusions, disclaimers and vague wording. Despite their claims, the Hashemites did not represent “the Arabs”.

The term “the Turks” is also shockingly loose. This was a clash against the Ottoman Empire, in whose army served a multitude of ethnic groups, including Arabs. It was not “the Turkish Empire” that the Sykes-Picot agreement sought to apportion, but the Ottoman Empire.
Objection 15

Problematic content

"The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 subdivided the former Turkish territories..."

Reasoning

Multiple issues.

Several international instruments discussed the apportioning of the spoils of war among the victors. It is not clear why the Treaty of Sèvres is selected here as the decisive one.

The term “subdivided” is inappropriate, because there isn’t a division that is then subdivided.

These were not “former Turkish territories”, but ‘former Ottoman territories’.
Objection 16

Problematic content
(page 9) “... to be governed as League of Nations ‘mandates’...”

Reasoning
There is no explanation what the League of Nations was.

The term ‘mandate’ is (mis)defined as “[a]n order or command”. In this context, the term ‘mandate’ is more likely derived from the following definition:

“the authority given to an elected group of people, such as a government, to perform an action or govern a country”

Objection 17

Problematic content
(page 9) “... with Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq going to Britain (see Figure 1.2)’...”

Reasoning
The text and the accompanying map (Figure 1.2) suggest that there were three mandates (Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq). In reality, there were just two British mandates in the Middle East: the Mandate of Palestine included what was later to become the Emirate of Transjordan. The other British mandate in the Middle East was the Mandate of Mesopotamia. ‘Iraq’ refers to the Kingdom of Iraq, which was established by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty – and not by League of Nations mandate.

The British government cut off from the initial Mandate of Palestine the territory east of the Jordan River (circa 80% of the area of the initial Mandate). This was constituted into the Emirate of Transjordan under Hashemite rule. The British administration forbade Jewish immigration to and settlement in the new Emirate. In 1946, the British government awarded this territory full independence, as the Kingdom of Transjordan.
PALESTINE UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE

LEBANON (French Mandate: Indepenend 1943)

IRAQ (Independent 1921, British interests)

SYRIA (French Mandate: Independent 1946)

The Palestine Mandate granted to Great Britain at the 1920 San Remo Conference as the region of a Jewish National Home

EGYPT (Independent 1922, British influence until 1952)

SAUDI ARABIA (Independent)

Approximate area in which the Zionists hoped to set up a Jewish National Home

Area coded by Great Britain to the French Mandate of Syria in 1923

Map: PASRIA, 2001
Objection 18

Problematic content
(page 9) “After 1918, there was considerable immigration to Palestine by the Jews. This was for a number of reasons:

- Many were encouraged by the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
- They hoped for a better life in Palestine.
- Many Jews, especially from eastern Europe and Russia, could no longer emigrate to the USA, which had restricted immigration in the years after the First World War.
- Hitler’s rise to power in Germany meant that many Jews wanted to escape Nazi persecution in the late 1930s."

Reasoning
Multiple issues:

The term “immigration to Palestine by the Jews” is awkward. Why not ‘Jewish immigration to Palestine/Eretz Israel’?

There is no context of pre-modern times immigration – e.g. Judah HeHasid (1700), etc.

The phrase “[a]fter 1918” gives the impression that the mass Jewish immigration started after 1918. This, of course, incorrect: between circa 1880 and 1914, circa 65,000 Jews had already immigrated and settled in Palestine/Eretz Israel.

In light of the above, the assertion that Jews immigrated to Palestine/Eretz Israel because they “were encouraged by the Balfour Declaration of 1917” is mere conjecture.

Similarly, the next ‘reason’: “They hoped for a better life in Palestine.” In 1918, Palestine was hardly a “better” place to live. It was under-developed, poor and riddled with disease.

“Malaria stands out as by far the most important disease in Palestine. For centuries it has decimated the population and it is an effective bar to the development and settlement of large tracts of fertile lands. [...] There are few regions actually free from it.”

First Annual Report of the British Mandate Department of Health (1921)

The assertion that the immigration of Jews to Palestine/Eretz Israel was driven by restrictions on immigration to the US is also problematic. Immigration to the US had averaged 45,000 Eastern European Jews per annum between 1880 and 1924 (when restrictions were applied). The average annual increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine Israel in the period 1924-1929 was just 10,000. So clearly the increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine/Eretz Israel was much more than a ‘redirection’ of the (now restricted) immigration to the US.

It is true that “Hitler’s rise to power in Germany meant that many Jews wanted to escape Nazi persecution in the late 1930s.” However, this period coincided with the Arab Revolt and the British restrictions to Jewish immigration – which vastly moderated the effect of German Nazi persecution on Jewish immigration to Palestine/Eretz Israel. Also, before 1939 the Nazi persecution only affected German Jews – but between 1929 and 1939 just 60,000 (out of a total of circa 300,000 Jews who immigrated to Palestine/Eretz Israel) were German Jews.

It is unclear why the list of ‘reasons’ drawn by the Hodder authors does not include the most obvious one: Zionism.
In addition, it is strange that the Hodder textbook authors make no reference to Arab migration to Palestine/Eretz Israel, both before and during the British Mandate.

"The number of Arabs who have entered Palestine illegally from Syria and Transjordan is unknown. But probably considerable."
Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1946

“This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Trans-Jordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”
(Note: C.S. Jarvis was the British governor of the Sinai in 1923-1936)

Objection 19
Problematic content
(page 9) “What can you learn from Figure 1.3 about the effects of Jewish immigration to Palestine?”

Reasoning
Figure 1.3 shows the growth of Jewish versus Arab population. It is not clear how students can learn anything about “the effects of Jewish immigration”, as the chart does not contain any information about the effects. In fact, Figure 1.3 isn’t actually very useful in quantitatively assessing the Jewish immigration, as the chart shows only the combined contributions of immigration and natural population growth.

Objection 20
Problematic content
(page 9) “Jewish immigration produced tensions between the Jewish settlers and the Palestinian Arab population and this led to clashes.”

Reasoning
Multiple issues:
The term “Jewish settlers” is misleading, given the connotations that it has nowadays. The vast majority of these people were legal immigrants, who were living and working on land legally purchased.

The term “Palestinian Arab population” is also misleading: at the time, both Jews and Arabs were ‘Palestinians’; both made up the population. A better term would have been ‘Arab community’.

There is no explanation of why the Jewish immigration “produced tensions” and why such tensions should lead to clashes. Should we understand that any immigration must necessarily produce tensions? And that such tensions always result in violent clashes? This is essential information, as it is key to understanding the causes of the conflict; it is strange that the Hodder authors chose to omit any such explanation and to dispatch this key issue in one sentence.

Objection 21
Problematic content
(page 9) “Increasing Jewish immigration made Britain’s task in trying to govern Palestine much more difficult (there were 20,000 British troops in Palestine by 1939) and led to contradictory British policies:

• Some policies seemed more sympathetic to the Jews. For example, defence was provided for Jewish settlers against resisting Arabs and Britain even helped train Jewish militia squads such as the Haganah. Furthermore, Britain often imposed harsh treatment on the Arabs, including fines, the destruction of houses and even torture.

• However, Britain also brought in policies to support the Arabs. For example, immigration controls on Jews were imposed from 1936 which reduced the number entering Palestine from 60,000 in 1935 to 11,000 in 1938.”

Reasoning
Multiple issues in this passage:

It is unclear how “[i]Increasing Jewish immigration”, in and of itself made Britain’s task […] much more difficult”. The reference to police numbers may suggest that it was difficult to police those immigrants. What the authors surely mean (but do not adequately express) is that the clashes caused by the conflict between the two communities made Britain’s governing task much more difficult.

British policies were contradictory from the very beginning. It is not Jewish immigration that led to contradictory policies.

The term “Jewish settlers” is again misleadingly employed, see reasoning in previous objections.

It is also very unclear why defending Jewish communities against violence should be considered “sympathetic to the Jews”. Surely, this is the normal task of any government or police force.

If the Jewish communities were in need for “defence”, it is clear that they were attacked. It is unclear, therefore, why the authors should refer to the attackers as “resisting Arabs”. Are the students to understand that violence directed of immigrants constitutes ‘resistance’? Or that any resistance to acts perceived as unjust must be violent?

The phrase “imposed harsh treatment” is clunky. Treatment is not imposed. Perhaps ‘Britain treated the Arabs harshly…’ or ‘Britain’s treatment of the Arabs was harsh…’?
In reality, Britain’s treatment of both communities was harsh. It included restrictions of rights, arbitrary arrests and house searches, deportations, destruction of property, collective punishments and even executions.

“Chanting the song of the Revisionist Party and dressed in its uniform, 19-year-old Shlomo ben Joseph steadily walked to the gallows in the troop-surrounded prison at Acre at 8 a.m.”

The Canadian Jewish Chronicle - July 1, 1938

Objection 22

Problematic content
(page 10) “This led to clashes between the Arabs and the British, and between Jews and Arabs, which became increasingly violent over time. The revolt led to the death of hundreds of Arabs and Jews and dozens of British soldiers and police. Britain began to seriously question its position in Palestine and drew up plans to prepare for a form of self-government for both Jews and Arabs in Palestine.”

Reasoning

Multiple issues in this passage:

The wording is woolly: the 1936 Arab general strike did not ‘lead’ “to clashes between the Arabs and the British, and between Jews and Arabs” – it was accompanied by attacks by Arabs on Jewish and British targets.

“The spark for the uprising was an attack on 15 April 1936 on a convoy of taxis on the Nablus to Tulkarm road in which the assailants murdered two Jewish passengers.”


Similarly, the revolt did not ‘lead’ “to the death of hundreds of Arabs and Jews and dozens of British soldiers and police.” Circa 5,000 Arabs were killed, mostly by the British army and police. 300 Jews were killed by Arabs, as well as 262 members of the British security forces.

Objection 23

Problematic content
(page 10) “The Peel Commission of 1937 proposed that the Jews and Arabs should be allowed to rule themselves in Palestine (see Source B). This was accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs. Two years later, the MacDonald Report suggested a shared government and restricted Jewish immigration. Not surprisingly, this was rejected by the Jews.”

Reasoning

Multiple issues here:
As the first real attempt to investigate on the ground and understand the nature of the conflict, the Peel Commission was a seminal moment in the history of the conflict. Some of its conclusions and recommendations have been vindicated by future events. It surely deserves more than two sentences.
Map of the territorial plan produced by the Peel Commission. The red line is the proposed contour of the Jewish state. The shaded area and the port city of Haifa were to remain ruled by the British administration. The rest of the territory was to be united with Transjordan and granted independence as an Arab state.

There was no “MacDonald Report”. The authors probably refer to the Statement of Policy issued by the British Government in May 1939, which is sometimes referred to as ‘the MacDonald White Paper’. But juxtaposing this document to the Peel Commission makes no sense, as the two had nothing in common: the White Paper was a government political decision, while the Peel Commission was an investigation, analysis and a set of recommendations submitted to the British government. Incidentally, the White Paper was rejected not just by “the Jews”, but also by the leadership of the Arabs.
Objection 24

Problematic content

(page 11) “When war broke out in September 1939, there were few Jews who did not support Britain in their fight against Germany. However, there were also extreme Zionists who felt that the decision to partition Palestine and restrict Jewish immigration should be opposed.”

Reasoning

The sentence “there were few Jews who did not support Britain in their fight against Germany” is awkward and potentially misleading. Why the undue focus on the “few Jews who did not”? Why not ‘the vast majority of Jews in Palestine/Eretz Israel supported Britain in their fight against Nazi Germany’?

The phrase “extreme Zionists” is very misleading, as it suggests that Lehi were ‘more Zionist’ than the Ben Gurion-led mainstream. In reality, the two strands did not differ in their determination to fight the White Paper, but only on the methods to be employed and the timing of that fight.

“We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there were no war.”


It is astounding that, while discussing the attitude towards Britain in its war against Nazi Germany, the Hodder textbook authors have decided to airbrush two seminal aspects:

- The Jewish Brigade, which fought as part of the British Army against the Nazi enemy;
- The activity and influence of Haj Amin al-Husseini (Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and, at the time, the main leader of Arabs in Palestine/Eretz Israel). Throughout World War II, Al-Husseini supported the Nazi regime – including by broadcasting Nazi propaganda in Arabic and helping with the recruitment of SS troops from among Bosnian Muslims. He did his best to sabotage attempts to save European Jews and asked Hitler to deal with Jews in the Middle East in the same way as in Europe. Al-Husseini was very influential also after the war, in particular in suppressing any Arab tendency to reach an accommodation, as well as in organising violent actions against British and – especially – Jewish targets.

Objection 24

Problematic content

(page 11) “During the war there emerged extreme groups such as Irgun and the Stern Gang, also known as Lehi.”

Reasoning

Wrong, Irgun was founded in 1930s, years before the war. Even more importantly, it is not clear why Irgun is included here together with Lehi. Irgun had suspended any hostile action against British targets, for the duration of the war. In fact, it is because they disagreed with this policy, that Lehi was formed – as a splinter of Irgun.

The term “emerged” is not very informative. Irgun split off from Haganah. Lehi further split off from Irgun, as mentioned above.
It is unclear why the Hodder textbook authors use the term “Stern Gang”. It is customary for historians to refer to various groups and organisations by the name they chose themselves (in this case Lehi), not by the designations employed by their adversaries.

**Objection 25**

**Problematic content**

(page 11) “As the war went on, the Stern Gang committed various acts of terrorism, and even attempted to assassinate the British High Commissioner in Palestine.”

**Reasoning**

The judgmental term “terrorism” may be employed in the news industry, but it is misplaced in history lessons. Its meaning – still not clearly defined nowadays – changed through history. It is disputable whether attempts to assassinate the British High Commissioner (a senior figure in an oppressive colonial administration) constitutes an act of terrorism or of violent struggle for national liberation. In addition, the term is employed selectively: it is not used to describe Arab violent acts against Jewish civilians, against British targets or against dissenting Arab individuals and organisations; it is, on the other hand, employed to describe violent acts committed by Jews. The Hodder textbook authors employ the term “Arab Revolt” to describe the series of strikes and violent acts that occurred in 1936-1939. It is unclear why they do not use the parallel term ‘Jewish Revolt’ here.

**Objection 26**

**Problematic content**

(page 11) “Moreover, the war left Britain heavily dependent on the support of the USA where, because of a large and powerful Jewish community, there was increasing support for the idea of a Jewish state in the Middle East.”

**Reasoning**

Attributing the “increasing support for the idea of a Jewish state in the Middle East” in the US to its “large and powerful Jewish community” is extremely problematic. In 1945, Jews represented circa 3.5% of the US population. Most – but by no means all – were supportive of the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine/Eretz Israel. But, while the Jewish community wielded a certain influence, there is ample evidence that it was never able (nor, indeed, intent on) to translate that influence into a change in US foreign policy. For example, Jewish efforts to provide a safe haven for German Jews, or later to try and save more European Jews, were largely unsuccessful.

The US support for the Jews in Palestine/Eretz Israel (which was by no means complete and unwavering) is much better explained by the general Western sympathy for Jews after the Holocaust, as well as the religion-motivated support of large layers of the Christian communities in the US.

**Objection 27**

**Problematic content**

(page 11) “Britain faced an impossible military situation in Palestine because it had to try to deal with increasing terrorist activities, especially from the Jews, which continued after the war.”
Reasoning

Britain’s military situation was hardly “impossible”. Rather, it was the political situation that was extremely embarrassing. Just like in other places (the most prominent example was India), Britain was finding it difficult to justify oppressive domination over people that desired self-determination.

The use of the term “terrorist” has already been discussed.

In any case, either the “terrorist activities” were “increasing”, or they “continued”. In reality, until towards the end of the war, there were relatively few violent acts by Jews against British targets. This is because both the Haganah and the Irgun had decided to abstain from such actions for the duration of the war.

Objection 28

Problematic content

(page 11) “In August 1945, the Zionist conference decided on a policy of active opposition to British rule in Palestine. Their leaders ordered the Haganah to co-operate with Irgun and the Stern Gang to carry out terrorist activities against British military bases, railways, trains and bridges in Palestine.”

Reasoning

There was no “Zionist conference”. The establishment of the Jewish Resistance Movement was decided upon through negotiations in a series of informal meetings.

The term “terrorist” is once again (mis)employed. It is not clear why acts “against British military bases, railways, trains and bridges in Palestine” constitute ‘terrorism’. Although still loosely defined, the term is most often employed to describe indiscriminate acts of violence against civilians – not against the military and administrative assets of a colonial power.

Objection 29

Problematic content

(page 11) “Jewish attacks on British forces now increased, sometimes in retaliation for death sentences passed on Jewish fighters. In April 1946, six British soldiers were murdered in one incident (see Source F on page 13).”

Reasoning

These were not “death sentences passed on...”; they were actual executions – by hanging. British repression did not consist only of executions and heavy prison terms – it included brutal searches, deportations, collective punishments, etc.

“The answer the British hit on was Eritrea, which had been captured from the Italians.

On 14 October 1944, 251 of the toughest prisoners were put on planes bound for the capital, Asmara.”

“One hundred and ten Jews were today evicted from their homes in the Hadar Hacarmel section of Haifa by the Palestine Government as collective punishment for the blasting of a military jeep on a nearby road ten days ago.”

Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), report from Jerusalem, 13 April 1947 (from JTA Archive, Vol. XIV No. 86)

It is unclear what April 1946 incident the authors refer to. Certainly not the one referenced (Source F on page 13), which occurred in July 1947.

The use of Source F (a horrific photo showing two British soldiers hanged by Irgun members) is wrong on many levels. What is the purpose of showing the students this particular “Source”? Is this about teaching history – or eliciting emotional reactions? Needless to say, many horrific things occurred at the time – including this gruesome episode, itself a reaction to the no-less-horrible hanging of Irgun fighters by the British authorities, a few hours earlier.

Objection 30

Problematic content

(page 12) “In July 1946, Irgun, the Jewish terrorist organisation, bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (see Source E). This was because it was the British administrative headquarters for Palestine. The bombing was also in retaliation for an attack by British troops on the Jewish Agency in June of 1946.”

Reasoning

The Hodder authors appear to miss no opportunity to juxtapose the terms ‘Jews’ or ‘Jewish’ and ‘terrorism/terrorist’. Beyond the problematic use of the term ‘terrorism’ (which has been discussed before), what is the purpose of this repetitive use? Is this a history lesson, or an exercise in indoctrination tactics?

The King David Hotel was not ‘just’ “the British administrative headquarters for Palestine”, but also the headquarters of the British military forces in the territory – a fact that is (or should be) very relevant – especially in light of the use of the term ‘terrorism’.

No less than 3 ‘Sources’ are provided for this one event. It is unclear why – and what are these ‘Sources’ supposed to teach the students.

Objection 31

Problematic content

(page 12) “ACTIVITIES

[...]

3. Put together a headline for a British newspaper for the day after the bombing of the King David Hotel”.

Reasoning

It is unclear what is the point of such ‘Activity’. Is this a history lesson, or one in Journalism?

Objection 32

Problematic content

(page 13) “This and the factors described below influenced Britain’s decision to withdraw.”
- The impact of Jewish terrorist activities, such as the bombing of the King David Hotel, on British public opinion. There was increasing public concern at the number of British troops and police being killed in Palestine. In the summer of 1947, one incident finally convinced Britain that it should withdraw from Palestine. This was when two British soldiers were hanged in revenge for the execution of three Irgun members. A photograph of two men hanging from a tree appeared on the front page of several British newspapers (see Source F).
- The economic and military strain of fighting the Second World War meant Britain had to cut back somewhere. The British Labour government under Prime Minister Attlee was committed to reducing the scale of Britain’s overseas commitments and to increasing its spending on welfare in the UK.
- In 1947 a ship, the Exodus, carrying Holocaust survivors, was prevented by the British from landing its passengers in Palestine, and was turned back to Germany. This incident attracted widespread publicity, winning much sympathy for the Jewish refugees, while Britain came in for worldwide criticism.

Reasoning
Multiple issues:

While all three factors listed may be said to have “influenced Britain’s decision to withdraw”, the authors appear to miss arguably the most compelling factor: the fact that, especially in the aftermath of World War II, forcibly ruling over other peoples was becoming unpopular and politically unsustainable. This is the reason why Britain decided to withdraw not just from Palestine/Eretz Israel, but also from places like India. While the three factors listed may have somewhat accelerated it, the withdrawal from Palestine was part of a general process, which would lead to the complete dissolution of the British, and other colonial empires.

The phrase “Jewish terrorist” appears once more – this has already been discussed above.

Similarly, Source F is referenced once again.

The description of the Exodus incident misses some important details:
- The ship was forcibly boarded by British forces in international waters, in the face of active opposition by the crew and passengers – leading to the killing of 1 crew and 2 passengers.
- The Holocaust survivors were forcibly disembarked by British troops and interned in camps in Germany

These details are essential in understanding the full extent of international outrage caused by this episode – and the embarrassment suffered by the British government as a result.

It is hard to understand why the authors do not provide any ‘Source’ or visual aid in this case.

Objection 33
Problematic content
(page 14) “The UN set up the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNESCOP), which was to make recommendations on what to do about the Palestine question.”
Reasoning

UNSCOP, not UNESCO. This may be a mere typo, but it has the potential to cause confusion with UNESCO.

The Committee was charged by the UN General Assembly not just to “make recommendations”, but “to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine”


Also, to

“submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine;”

Ibidem

Objection 34

Problematic content

(page 14) “Its report was completed in August 1947, and the UN then drew up a partition plan for Palestine based on these recommendations, with the date for British withdrawal set for 14 May 1948.”

Reasoning

The UNSCOP Report was dated 3 September 1947. Though it is not clear why the date of the report should be prioritised, rather than the date of the UNGA Resolution (which isn’t mentioned).

The Resolution did not set the date of “14 May 1948”. That date was later chosen by the British government.

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;


Objection 34

Problematic content

(page 14) “The plan called for the partitioning of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab (see Figure 1.4), with other key points as follows:

- The plan included the majority of Jews in the Jewish allocated area, although a small number of Jewish settlements were in the Arab designated area.
- The Jewish area was 56 per cent of Palestine, compared to the 43 per cent which went to the Arabs.
- Jerusalem and Bethlehem were to be an international zone.”

Reasoning

The phrase “allocated area” is awkward and potentially misleading. These were supposed to be independent states.
The first key point also misses the fact that Jerusalem (with its 100,000 Jews, representing an absolute majority of its population – and circa 17% of the entire Jewish population in Palestine/Eretz Israel) had not been included in the Jewish state.

The second key point misses the rather relevant fact that the very arid Negev/Naqab Desert constituted more than half of the area of the Jewish state.

Given its seminal position in terms of setting the scene for the future conflict, UN Resolution 181 deserves a more complete presentation. The ‘key points’ miss the fact that both states were non-contiguous: each was made up of three pieces of territory, with the only passage being provided by 2 ‘intersection points’ – whose status was not specified. This isn’t clear also in the map presented (Figure 1.4), which inadvertently seems to show the ‘intersection points’ as thin passages belonging to the Arab state.

There was to be an economic union between the two states. The international trusteeship regime for the Jerusalem area (including Bethlehem) was to remain in force for 10 years and be followed by a referendum. Even during the international regime, the inhabitants of the area were to be given the possibility to opt for the citizenship of either state.
Objection 35

Problematic content

(page 14) “The Jewish leaders were prepared to accept the plan but it was rejected by the Arabs, who claimed that the Jews had been given the best land.

Nevertheless, on 29 November 1947, the majority of the UN General Assembly, 33 to 13, voted for the partition plan, which was henceforth adopted as UN Resolution 181.”
Reasoning

Multiple issues:

Clunky and misleading: the Jewish leaders accepted the plan (and the Resolution), not “were prepared to”.

‘The Arabs’: loose use of the term.

The leadership of the Palestinian Arabs and all the Arab countries rejected not just “the plan”, but also the UN Resolution.

The reason for their rejection was not that “the Jews had been given the best land”. While they attacked the Resolution as unfair, they also made clear their rejection of the principle of partition, irrespective of territory and borders.

“The Palestinians’ position remained unchanged from the beginning of the British mandate to its end: they opposed partition and supported the establishment of a political system that would reflect the wishes of the majority.”

In addition, the Arab states made no secret of their intention to prevent the implementation of the resolution, if necessary by force.

Strangely, the authors choose to say nothing about the attitude of Britain with respect to the UN Resolution:

- Britain chose to abstain during the vote in the General Assembly;
- The British government soon made clear that, despite Britain’s status as Mandatory Power (and despite the bespoke request of the United Nation General Assembly), it had no intention to contribute to its implementation;
- Despite the request of the Commission appointed by the UN, the British Administration of Palestine Mandate refused to allow its entry to Palestine until two weeks before the end of the Mandate. This, in effect, made it impossible for the Commission to discharge its duties. In so doing, the British government acted in contravention to the requirements included in the Resolution.

“The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.”
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253, accessed 14 April 2020

“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would not regard favourably any proposal by the Commission to proceed to Palestine earlier than two weeks before the date of the termination of the Mandate.”
“The Commission is convinced that this limitation on its arrival in Palestine would make it impossible for the Commission to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by the resolution of the General Assembly. The Commission has been informed that the Mandatory Power proposes to relinquish its responsibility for the Government of Palestine as a whole and not piecemeal. In consequence, the Commission, in two short weeks in Palestine, would have required to prepare itself to assume responsibility, under most difficult circumstances, for the full burden of a complex administrative structure and for maintaining law and order in the country.”


Objection 36

Problematic content

*(page 14)* “The creation of Israel

The British decision to withdraw led each side to prepare to fight for Palestine. The Jews were the better organised, having already set up militia forces such as Irgun and the Haganah. In addition, the Jews introduced conscription to the Haganah as well as ordering weapons from Czechoslovakia. The Arabs, on the other hand, were able to bring in armaments from the neighbouring Arab states.”

Reasoning

Multiple issues:

‘Creation’ is not the best term to describe the birth of a state. Terms like ‘establishment’, ‘foundation’ or ‘founding’ are more often employed. Given that ‘Israel’ has multiple meanings (for Jews it may mean ‘the Jewish people’), it would have been clearer to employ the official name of the new state: the State of Israel.

Paramilitary militias were formed by both sides, and started long before the “British decision to withdraw”. The Haganah was formed in 1920. On the Arab side, Al-Kaff Al-Aswad (the Black Hand, led by Izz ad-Din al-Qassam) was set up in 1929. The Arabs in Palestine had established two other paramilitary militias: Al-Futuwwa and Al-Najjada. Jaysh al-Jihad al Muqaddas (Army of the Holy War) was set up in 1947 and was led by Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini (a nephew of Haj Amin al-Husseini) and Hasan Salama.

The passage also ignores other factors relevant to the balance of forces between the two sides:

- The contribution of external forces, such as the Arab Liberation Army (a 6,000-strong army of volunteers from Arab League countries, trained, equipped and officered by Syria, which infiltrated from Syria starting from January 1948). Additional Arab volunteer forces infiltrated from Egypt – for instance a unit formed by Muslim Brotherhood.
- The Arab Legion (the regular army of the Kingdom of Transjordan, but equipped, trained, officered and to a certain extent controlled by Britain). This small but well trained and equipped force was allowed by Britain to enter and operate inside the Mandate of Palestine.

“On November 30, 1947, the Arab Legion began operations in support of supply convoys to Arab forces around Jerusalem. Glubb tried to distance his force from direct
involvement in the fighting—until May 1948, when the Jews of the Etzion Bloc, a group of settlements on the road north of Hebron, attacked Arab reinforcements and supplies destined for Jerusalem. On May 4, a week before the British Palestine Mandate would expire, Arab tanks, armored cars of the Desert Patrol and riflemen drawn from the Arab locals stormed the four Jewish settlements that comprised the Etzion Bloc. At stake for Glubb, from a military perspective, was a huge British-organized arms convoy bound for Amman.

Glubb met with Sheik Mohammed Ali Jabary, the mayor of Hebron, on May 10 and laid plans for a final attack. The call went out for villagers to help in this jihad (holy war). Armed with old rifles and Sten submachine guns, and bearing sacks in which to carry away booty from their looting, the villagers answered the call.

On May 12, Glubb’s men stormed the settlements.”

David M. Castlewitz: Glubb Pasha and the Arab Legion, Military History magazine, April 1998.

Objection 37

Problematic content

(page 14) “There was armed conflict between the two sides by the middle of 1947, such as the Battle for the Jerusalem Roads, with the Jews trying to split the Arab-held territory in two by getting control of the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem.”

Reasoning

Multiple issues:

Various acts of violence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine/Eretz Israel had been taken place much earlier than “the middle of 1947”. However, given the presence of the British army and police, it is an exaggeration to call such clashes an “armed conflict”. It is probably more correct to mark the beginning of an “armed conflict” at the end of November 1948. Although the British army was still in the area, it was already planning the withdrawal and gradually reduced its involvement in keeping complete control.

There was no “Battle for the Jerusalem Roads”—certainly not by mid-1947. There was a Battle (or War) of the Roads and a Battle for Jerusalem. Neither consisted of “the Jews trying to split the Arab-held territory in two”. The former is a name for the series of skirmishes along the roads linking the relatively isolated Jewish towns and villages—which crossed through Arab-controlled territory. The latter refers to the battles aimed at defending the Jewish neighbourhoods of Jerusalem and securing the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem—which served as the only land connection to these neighbourhoods. In fact, it would not have been geographically possible “to split the Arab-held territory in two by getting control of the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem”. Jaffa, buy the way, was and Arab state enclave inside the Jewish state, so the “the Jews” already had “control of the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem”. It is not clear what is the source that the Hodder authors have used for their strange assertion.
Objection 38

Problematic content
(page 14) “Both sides carried out atrocities such as when Irgun, in April 1948, massacred the inhabitants of Deir Yassin (see page 20).”

Reasoning
It is probably true that “both sides carried out atrocities”. What is unclear is: given that “both sides” did it, why have the Hodder authors chosen to give only one example – Deir Yassin? There were numerous instances of atrocities committed by Arab forces – for example the massacre of a Jewish medical convoy (13 April 1948) or the Kfar Etzion massacre committed a month later.

“[O]n 13 April 1948, Arabs attacked a convoy of supplies and civilian workers on its way to Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University [...] killing seventy-eight and wounding twenty-four. Dozens burned to death inside the buses, and the remains of twenty-three victims were never located. [...] On 13 May 1948 the Jewish settlement of Kfar Etzion (in the Hebron Highlands) surrendered. All of its defenders assembled near the school, waving white flags. After they were photographed with their hands in the air, the Arabs opened fire, killing many on the spot. The wounded were finished off with knives [...] Fifty people, fled to a nearby cellar, went to their deaths when hand grenades were tossed into their hiding place. The building was then blown off, burying them all. Altogether, 129 of the 133 inhabitants of Kfar Etzion perished in this barbaric massacre, and the settlement was razed.”

Objection 39

Problematic content
(page 14) “In addition, the British withdrawal led to the Jewish declaration of independence on 14 May 1948 (see Sources G and H).”

Reasoning
Many things “led to” Israel’s independence. It is unclear why the authors chose “the British withdrawal” as the most important/relevant one.

The phrase “Jewish declaration of independence” is problematic. Surely ‘Israel’s declaration of independence’ would have been a better formula.

Objection 40

Problematic content
(page 15) “David Ben Gurion, 1886-1970

1886   Born in Poland

[...]
1953  Retired as prime minister.

1955  Returned to government as defence minister.

1970  Retired from political life and died three years later on 1 December 1973, aged 87.”

Reasoning
Multiple issues:

Ben Gurion was born at Plonsk, then on the territory of the Russian Empire. Locating that birth in ‘Poland’ is an anachronism.

Although he announced in 1953 his intention to step down as Prime Minister, he actually retired only in 1954.

Although he initially returned to the government in 1955 as Defence Minister, he soon became again Prime Minister.

Objection 41
Problematic content
(page 16) “As soon as the state of Israel was declared, the neighbouring Arab states decided to support the Palestinian Arabs by invading Israel (see Source I).

Reasoning
Multiple issues:

The decision by “the neighbouring Arab states” to invade pre-dated Israel’s declaration of independence.

“As soon as” is not very informative. The invasion started the day after Israel was declared (so on 15 May 1948).

It is entirely fanciful to write that the invasion aimed “to support the Palestinian Arabs”. There is ample evidence that, in invading Israel, the Arab states were pursuing their own interests, which did not include the establishment of an independent Arab Palestinian state. In addition, the fact is that they did not establish such a state, despite the fact that the armistice agreements left them in possession of most of the territory allotted by the UN Resolution to the Arab state.

Objection 42
Problematic content
(page 16) “First phase, May-June 1948

The Palestinian Arabs were the first to take the offensive, with the help of volunteers from neighbouring countries.”

Reasoning
Surely, this sentence should refer to the pre-May 1948 phase – the civil war. In May-June 1948, the war was already between the Israeli forces and the Arab armies, with the Palestinian Arabs playing a very marginal role from a military point of view.
In general, the Hodder authors say very little about the civil war phase (30 November 1947-14 May 1948) which preceded the Arab invasion of 15 May 1948.

**Objection 43**

**Problematic content**

*(page 16)* “In the south, an Egyptian army crossed the border and attacked isolated Israeli settlements.”

**Reasoning**

Not so. The Egyptian Airforce (equipped with Spitfire planes) first raided Tel Aviv. The air raids lasted six days and killed dozens.

The Egyptian army attacked in two directions: one force progressed north along the coast, reaching within 20 miles south of Tel Aviv; the second force advanced north-east and reached the outskirts of Jerusalem. The two forces linked up in the Hebron Hills area, thus cutting the Israeli-held territory in
two and completing the encirclement of a large area of the Negev/Naqab Desert – including 12 Israeli villages.

The Egyptians did not just attack “isolated Israeli settlements”, but indeed managed to conquer some – in particular Yad Mordechai and Nitzanim.

It would have been helpful at this point if the textbook would have included a map of the attack.
Objection 44

Problematic content
(page 16) “In the north, Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese troops crossed the border.”

Reasoning
They did much more than “crossed the border.”

The Iraqi forces crossed from Transjordan, occupied a small Israeli enclave east of the River Jordan and immediately attacked Israeli villages – first pounding them with mortars and from the air, before assaulting them with infantry and armoured vehicles.

Similarly, the Syrian forces crossed over from the Golan Heights and immediately attacked several Israeli villages, including bombing from the air, artillery shelling and machine gun fire. A force equipped with French-made tanks managed to conquer the village of Samakh. Other Israeli villages
(Shaar Hagolan and Masada) were abandoned by their inhabitants, who fled towards the larger, better defended ones. The Syrians then took another Israeli village (Mishmar Hayarden), despite the fierce defence.

On 5 June, the Lebanese forces also crossed the border, attacked the small Israeli garrison at al-Malikiya and occupied the village.

Objection 45

Problematic content

(page 16) “The major conflict was the battle for Jerusalem, with the Israelis able to gain control of West Jerusalem without a big struggle.”

Reasoning

This is a very inaccurate and misleading account. “[T]he Israelis” did not need “to gain control of West Jerusalem”, which was mostly inhabited by Jews. They did need to hold on to the city, which was under siege by the Arab Legion (the regular army of the Kingdom of Transjordan, equipped, trained and officered by Britain), as well as by Egyptian and irregular Arab units.

"[I]n [the northern West Jerusalem neighbourhoods] there is scarcely a single home that has not been shelled, scarcely a family that has not suffered some loss in dead or wounded [...] [and the inhabitants] go hungry [...] One Hadassah Hospital alone [...] treated one thousand shell casualties in the two weeks between May 15th and 31st."

“Once again West Jerusalem was besieged and under dire threat; along its eastern edges, the Legion was mounting continuous attacks. Ben-Gurion feared a collapse.”
Ibidem, (Kindle Location 3192).

The Battle for Jerusalem (including the defence of West Jerusalem neighbourhoods, the seesaw battles over nearby villages and the attempts to lift and eventually bypass the Arab siege) was by far the toughest and most costly. The Hodder authors’ cavalier and dismissive attitude is utterly misplaced.
Arab Legion (Transjordanian) artillery shelling Jerusalem in 1948

Arab Legion soldier among the ruins of the Hurva Synagogue, the oldest in Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter

Jewish residents of Jerusalem’s Old City, fleeing from the Arab Legion attack

Objection 46
Problematic content

(page 16) “Assassination of UN mediator, September 1948
The special UN mediator, Count Bernadotte from Sweden, came up with a peace plan which would have kept Jerusalem as an international city under UN control. The following day he was assassinated by the Stern Gang.”

Reasoning

Firstly, the passage is part of Figure 1.5 The key stages of the Arab-Israeli War, 1948-49. Important as the assassination of Count Bernadotte may be seen, it was hardly a ‘key stage’ of the war – in fact it was not part of the war at all. Unbeknownst by the assassins, the Israeli leadership had already decided to reject Bernadotte’s proposals – so his assassination had little (if any) influence on the outcome of the war. It is unclear why the Hodder authors have decided to ‘stick’ this episode in the midst of an account of the key stages of the war – the rest of which deals with military events.

In addition, the description of the Bernadotte proposals is incomplete and misleading. They did not only refer to Jerusalem and, generally speaking, tended to revise the UN Partition Resolution to the detriment of Israel. There is compelling evidence that his proposals reflected primarily the interests of the British government.

“With their extensive governing experience in the Holy Land, the British plainly anticipated guiding the mediator's diplomacy in the ‘proper’ direction. Thus, in his diary, Bernadotte recalled that the first ‘outsider’ to call on him when he arrived in Paris on June 15, en route to Palestine, was Ashley Clarke, Britain’s chargé d'affaires in France. Discreetly, Clarke intimated to Bernadotte the lines of mediation that would enjoy British support. These included a revision of the partition formula, with the southern part of the Negev Desert (which the United Nations had allocated to the Jews) to go to Abdullah of Transjordan, while the Jews would receive as compensation western Galilee (an area the United Nations had allocated to the Arabs but which the Jews already had overrun). Finally, Jerusalem, originally designated for United Nations administration, should be given over to Abdullah in its totality, including the Jewish New City, whose inhabitants would enjoy autonomy.

Evidently Bernadotte was impressed by this scenario. In his own version, which he presented to the Security Council on June 27, he followed Britain's proposals with only minor alterations. Entirely gratified, Ernest Bevin then informed the House of Commons that "the recommendations of Count Bernadotte have the whole-hearted and unqualified support of the Government." Bevin's enthusiasm was understandable. The formula would have provided Britain with surrogate bases in the Negev Desert and Jerusalem mountains.”

Objection 47
Problematic content
(page 16) “The Israeli government, keen to retain international support, disbanded the Stern Gang and Irgun. Many of their members now joined the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).”

Reasoning
The government of Israel had formally disbanded Lehi (which the – by then withdrawn – British Administration had referred to as ‘the Stern Gang’) on 29 May 1948. Obviously, some of its members continued to be active, despite that. But, clearly, the dissolution of Lehi in May had nothing to do with the assassination of Count Bernadotte in September 1948. Reversing the chronology of these events seeks to imply that Lehi’s dissolution occurred after the assassination and as a consequence of it; in fact, it preceded it and was based on a completely different set of motivations.

Moreover, the textbook’s authors attribute Israeli government’s decision to disband Lehi and the Irgun to its eagerness “to retain international support”. What evidence is this based on? I am not aware than any such evidence exists – but there is plenty of evidence that the decision of 29 May 1948 was based on the desire to unify the armed forces of the new state, under the sole control of the government.

Objection 48
Problematic content
(page 16) “The various Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, signed armistice agreements, beginning with Egypt on 24 February, with the last being Syria as late as 20 July.”

Reasoning
The armistice agreements were very consequential in terms of the topic discussed (the Arab-Israeli conflict), as they glossed over issues and contained the seeds of further problems. For instance, the agreements with Egypt and Syria referred to De-Militarised Zones (DMZ), which were ill-defined; the agreement with Jordan called for free access to all holy sites, etc.

The very fact that they were armistice agreements, rather than peace treaties, is very significant. For these reasons, the armistice agreements deserve more than the few words that the authors dedicated to these important documents.

Objection 49
Problematic content
(page 16) “Israel acquired further land as an outcome of the war (see Figure 1.6).”

Reasoning
This is a very partial discussion of the outcomes of the 1947-1949 war. If the focus is on land acquisition, then it should be noted that the Arab countries acquired more territory than Israel did: especially Transjordan, which ended the war in possession of more than 2,000 square miles of “further land”. This territory (annexed by Transjordan/Jordan in 1950, in an act that gained almost no international recognition) is still called ‘the West Bank’ (of the River Jordan, Cisjordanie in French), a name it gained in order to be distinguished from the East Bank – i.e. Transjordan (Transjordanie in French).
Transjordan’s annexation of the West Bank (as opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in that territory and in the Gaza Strip) was to prove extremely consequential for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is therefore unclear why the authors chose to refer (both in the text and by providing a map) only to Israel’s acquisition of territory in this context.
Objection 50
Problematic content
(page 17) “The Jews were motivated to fight to save their new country; they were determined to win and could not afford to lose if they wanted to create the new state of Israel. They were especially motivated after being targeted in Europe in the Holocaust of 1933–45.”

Reasoning
No doubt the authors are right in this assessment. But they are not very thorough: for many (if not all) Jews, it wasn’t just a matter of political independence, but one of physical safety. Both prior and during the war, Arab leaders and media had issued bloodcurdling threats.

“[T]his will be a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the massacres of the Mongols or the Crusader wars.”

So one must add defence of one’s own life and family as another, rather compelling motivational factor.

Objection 51
Problematic content
(page 17) “Jewish forces were well disciplined and well led, and had been effectively trained by British experts.”

Reasoning
A small minority of Jews had indeed benefitted from training by British officers, but one cannot reasonably mention this aspect without also adding that the Arab side had (arguably) benefitted even more. In fact, the Arab Legion (the regular army of the Kingdom of Transjordan had been not just trained by British instructors, but was in fact led by British senior officers – including its commander, General John Glubb.

Objection 52
Problematic content
(page 17) “Moreover, the Israelis grew in effectiveness as the war unfolded, becoming better armed as they could import weapons partly paid for by contributions of money from Jews abroad, especially the USA”.

Reasoning
This is, once more, a strangely partial and fanciful analysis, which is not based on evidence. While the Jewish/Israeli side did raise funds abroad (among Jews and non-Jews), the total amount they spent on arms purchases was a fraction of the military budgets of the (already independent) Arab countries.

“The Yishuv spent some $78.3 million of this on arms purchases between October 1947 and March 1949.”
The discussion of ‘Israeli strengths’ misses the fact that by the end of 1948 no less than 13% of the Israeli population (men and women) served in the army. It ignores the local production of weaponry (including for instance the conversion of commercial lorries into armoured vehicles, the manufacturing of improvised mortars, etc.)

Objection 53
Problematic content
(page 17) “The Arabs also tended to act in their own self-interest and signed separate truces when it suited them (for example, Jordan, once it held the West Bank).”

Reasoning
Multiple issues:
The term “[t]he Arabs” is once again used loosely: the authors mean to say ‘each Arab country tended to act according to its own perceived interest...’

The use of the term “truces” may be misleading: the term previously used (page 16) was ‘armistice agreements’. There were also periods of ceasefire (which may be called “truces”), but they were not “signed”.

The use of the name “Jordan” is an anachronism: in 1947-1949 the country was called ‘Transjordan’.

Transjordan did sign a separate armistice agreements, as did Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. However, Transjordan was not the first Arab country to sign such an agreement – it was actually the one-but-last. It is therefore unclear why it has been chosen as an “example”. The point that the authors try to make with “once it held the West Bank” is also not clear. Transjordan had “held” the territory later called “the West Bank” for months by the time the armistice agreement was signed.

The use of the term “West Bank” is also an anachronism, the term came into use after the ‘union’ of that territory with the ‘East Bank’ (i.e. Transjordan).